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FOOD FORENSICS IN CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: THE RACE BETWEEN 
PLEADING STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 
Jeff Lingwall* 
This Article examines the emerging use of “food forensics” to discover injury 
in class action litigation. Based on increased public interest in what goes inside food, 
plaintiffs are beginning to rely on statistical and chemical testing to verify label claims. 
The test results often spur producers to re-examine their products, but can also raise 
plausibility concerns under the veneer of science and deny consumers data they need 
to make informed decisions about food. Drawing on examples ranging from olive oil 
to multivitamins and canned octopus to pet food, I show how product testing in 
litigation represents a race between the resolving power of test results and slower-
moving interpretation of pleading standards. I then propose a framework for navi-
gating testing claims based on traditional case screening tools and statistical princi-
ples. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have brought increasing public sensitivity to what goes inside food, 
this is reflected by a host of books and documentaries such as The Omnivore’s Dilemma, 
Real Food/Fake Food, and Food, Inc.1 Not surprisingly, this movement has been ac-
companied by litigation, such as disputing the use of “natural” on food labels. While 
                                                          
 * Assistant Professor of Business Administration at Truman State University; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., 
Carnegie Mellon University. I thank Catherine Pence and Gregory Jochems for able research assistance, and Beth 
Moscato and Chris Wray for helpful comments. Any errors are my own. 
 1. This is an extensive area of literature. See, e.g., MIKE ADAMS, FOOD FORENSICS: THE HIDDEN TOXINS 
LURKING IN YOUR FOOD AND HOW YOU CAN AVOID THEM FOR LIFELONG HEALTH (2016); LARRY OLMSTED, 
REAL FOOD / FAKE FOOD: WHY YOU DON’T KNOW WHAT YOU’RE EATING & WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 
(2016); ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL (2012); FOOD, INC. 
(Participant Media 2008); MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS 
(2006). See also MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: THE SECRETS BEHIND WHAT YOU EAT (2015); 
MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD: AN EATER’S MANIFESTO 1 (2008) (“Eat food. Not too much. Mostly 
plants.”); MICHAEL POLLAN, FOOD RULES: AN EATER’S MANUAL (2009); Irena Dumitrescu, The Curious Appeal of 
‘Bad’ Food, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 5, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/08/the-curi-
ous-appeal-of-bad-food/494255/ (“Experts shout culinary commandments from every direction: Daily meals . . . 
must be ethically sourced, organic, raw, gluten-free, meat-free, dairy-free, protein-rich, low-fat, low in sodium, carbon 
neutral, dirt-encrusted, pre-soaked, and fair trade. It can be hard to keep track of all these contradictory gastronomic 
rules.”). Nor have law reviews been spared. E.g., Rebecca L. Goldberg, Administering Real Food: How the Eat-Food 
Movement Should—and Should Not—Approach Government Regulation, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 773, 815 (2012) (discussing 
whether the “eat food” movement should pursue increased labeling regulation); James I. Pearce, A Brave New Jungle: 
Factory Farming and Advocacy in the Twenty-First Century, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 433, 451-54 (2010) (describing 
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this has drawn attention in the academic literature,2 the use of “food forensics”—its 
emerging core—has not.3 This Article fills the gap. Using examples ranging from pet 
food to olive oil, multivitamins, wine, oats, and canned octopus, it shows that product 
testing has resulted in a race between the ever-better resolving power of test results 
and the slower-moving evolution of pleading standards, a race in which increasingly 
powerful testing methods stretch the boundaries of legal injury.4 Due to asymmetric 
litigation costs, producers may react to even implausible legal theories by changing 
labeling. As a result, the same consumers this litigation intends to protect may find 
themselves without the data necessary to make informed decisions about food. 
For example, while testing provides a path for independent verification of food 
labeling, testing allegations often assume a life of their own before scientific and legal 
issues are resolved. For instance, pet food giant, Nestlé Purina, attacked a rival pro-
ducer of high end pet food, Blue Buffalo (“Blue”), based on the results of “highly 
sophisticated . . . independent laboratory” testing, that claimed to identify the pres-
ence of undisclosed animal byproducts in Blue’s food.5 Based on this alleged testing, 
thirteen consumer class action lawsuits, spanning the United States, were filed against 
Blue, none of which performed additional testing.6 When Blue sought details on the 
                                                          
public health concerns from industrial food production); Kate L. Harrison, Organic Plus: Regulating Beyond the Current 
Organic Standards, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 211-13 (2008) (discussing the organic food movement); Morgan L. 
Holcomb, Book Review: Our Agricultural Policy Dilemma: The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals, by Michael 
Pollan, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 249, 272-75 (2007) (putting the “real food” movement in context of food security). 
 2. See, e.g., Melissa Mortazavi, Tort as Democracy: Lessons from the Food Wars, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 929, 945-50, 962-65 
(2015) (discussing the role of “natural” food litigation in cultural discourse); Sarah Valenzuela, Tracing the Evolution of 
Food Fraud Litigation: Adopting an Ascertainability Standard that is “Natural”, 34 REV. LITIG. 609, 616-34 (2015) (describ-
ing trends in food fraud litigation, from preemption challenges to attacks on class ascertainability); Shea Thompson, 
Artificially “Natural”: Class Action Lawsuits Attack Misleading “Natural” Claims in FDA’s Absence, 47 IND. L. REV. 893, 
897-907 (2014) (describing “natural” litigation). 
 3. See supra note 2. See also Paul Chan, Liable Labels: Consumer Groups and Regulators Are Continuing to Test New 
Theories Against Manufacturers Over Food Labels, 37 L.A. LAWYER 25, 25-29 (2015) (surveying labeling litigation without 
discussing product testing); Diana R. H. Winters, The Magical Thinking of Food Labeling: The NLEA as a Failed Statute, 
89 TUL. L. REV. 815, 849-51 (2015) (surveying litigation surrounding the NLEA without discussing product testing 
litigation); Sylvia Zarski, Comment: Can You Judge Your Food by Looking at Its Cover? How Courts’ Application of Federal 
Preemption Allows Misleading Food Labeling to Slip Through the Regulatory Cracks, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 1119, 1128-36 (2015) 
(discussing preemption challenges to food labeling litigation without discussing testing). See generally MIKE ADAMS, 
FOOD FORENSICS: THE HIDDEN TOXINS LURKING IN YOUR FOOD AND HOW YOU CAN AVOID THEM FOR 
LIFELONG HEALTH (2016) (testing common food products for presence of contaminants); Rahi Azizi, “Supplement-
ing” the DSHEA: Congress Must Invest the FDA with Greater Regulatory Authority over Nutraceutical Manufacturers by Amending 
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, 98 CAL. L. REV. 439, 461-66 (2010) (advocating for regulatory pre-
market testing of dietary supplements under the NLEA); S. Primrose, M. Woolfe, & S. Rollinson, Food Forensics: 
Methods for Determining the Authenticity of Foodstuffs, 21 TRENDS IN FOOD SCI. & TECH. 582, 584-88 (2010) (reviewing 
methods to determine food content); Mark Woolfe & Sandy Primrose, Food Forensics: Using DNA Technology to Combat 
Misdescription and Fraud, 22 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 222, 224 (2004) (describing detection methods for deter-
mining food content such as fish species, rice and potato variety, and olive oil provenance). 
 4. Cf. CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
(2007) (describing the history of inequality over the twentieth century as a race between education and technology). 
 5. Answer to Second Amended Complaint, Third Amended Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint at ¶ 2, 
Nestlé Purina Petcare Co. v. Blue Buffalo Co., No. 4:14-cv-00859-RWS (E.D. Mo. May 19, 2015) [hereinafter “De-
fendant’s Answer”]. Animal byproducts include the non-prime elements of the animal, such as the heads and feet of 
poultry or brain and bone of livestock. See, e.g., What is in Pet Food, ASS’N OF AM. FEED CONTROL OFFICIALS, (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2016) http://www.aafco.org/Consumers/What-is-in-Pet-Food [https://perma.cc/33X8-3CWG]. 
 6. These were consolidated in In re: Blue Buffalo Co., Mktg & Sales Practices Litig., No. 4:14-md-02562-RWS 
(E.D. Mo. 2014). 
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testing, Purina refused, arguing that “Blue Buffalo should have access to the ingredi-
ents contained in its own products.”7 Once discovery began, Blue found the labora-
tory in question consisted of one person, who operated out of his own basement, 
had worked for Purina for 28 years, and used equipment provided by Purina.8 Un-
fortunately for Blue, and regardless of its critique of Purina’s testing methodology, 
discovery also revealed animal byproducts had been used because of supplier error, 
and Blue settled the consumer claims for $32 million.9 
A little testing goes a long way. Purina successfully pled its complaint without 
providing any substantive detail on the testing methodology, which then allowed 
third-parties to plead injury based on the same uncertain results. This spawned mul-
tiple class actions and a truly ugly litigation between companies with common inter-
ests in animal welfare.10 Despite these problems—and these are problems—the test-
ing did reveal error in Blue’s supply chain and let concerned consumers receive 
compensation. 
Due to the unique power of testing to drive litigation for good or ill, this article 
proposes a framework for evaluating product testing at the pleading stage that will 
aid courts, consumers, and litigants. The framework is based on a simple premise: a 
complaint with testing should be evaluated according to the same standard as a com-
plaint without testing. Test results may reveal potential injury, but are not sufficient 
to render an injury plausible any more than artful drafting of a complaint.11 In par-
ticular, courts evaluating testing claims should consider a four-step framework based 
on traditional tools like Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 9(b), along with a basic understanding 
of statistics. First, courts should require details about product testing to be pled as 
part of the “how” of consumer fraud under Rule 9. Second, courts should be willing 
                                                          
 7. Defendant’s Answer Exhibit T, No. 4:14-cv-00859-RWS (E.D. Mo. May 19, 2015) (“Purina will provide Blue 
Buffalo with the relevant test results at the appropriate time under the Court’s rules, procedures, and orders. It would 
seem that Blue Buffalo should have access to the ingredients contained in its own products?”). 
 8. Defendant’s Answer at ¶ 77, No. 4:14-cv-00859-RWS (E.D. Mo. May 19, 2015) (alleging “Nestlé Purina has 
been one of Dr. Makowski’s largest clients for nearly three decades, and it purchased much of the equipment in his 
lab for him”); Deposition of James Makowski, PhD at 86, 90, 95, 126, Defendant’s Answer, No. 4:14-cv-00859-RWS. 
Purina naturally, and publically, disputed Blue’s characterization of Dr. Makowski’s lab. E.g., Ken Niedziela, Legal 
Fight Escalates Between Purina, Blue Buffalo, VETERINARY PRAC. NEWS (Sept. 22, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.veteri-
narypracticenews.com/Legal-Fight-Escalates-Between-Purina-Blue-Buffalo/ [https://perma.cc/964L-Q37F] (de-
scribing disputes over Purina’s testing methods). 
 9. See Jessica Karmasek, Federal Judge Approves Blue Buffalo’s $32 Million Settlement of False Advertising Class Actions, 
LEGAL NEWSLINE (May 20, 2016, 9:38 AM), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510736267-federal-judge-approves-
blue-buffalo-s-32-million-settlement-of-false-advertising-class-actions [https://perma.cc/T7FL-H4SX]. The Blue 
Buffalo case is discussed further in infra Section II. 
 10. E.g., Jody Godoy, Purina, Blue Buffalo Told To ‘Play Nice’ In False Ad Fight, LAW360 (June 17, 2015, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/668829/purina-blue-buffalo-told-to-play-nice-in-false-ad-fight 
[https://perma.cc/S5WB-VNSZ] (quoting U.S. District Judge Rodney Sippel, supervising multidistrict litigation 
stemming from Purina’s late-disclosed testing of Blue Buffalo products, as noting “[i]f not abundantly clear from the 
last status conference and the court’s most recent orders, the court has reached the limits of its considerable patience 
with discovery disputes in this case,” and “given their past behavior, the court feels compelled to remind all counsel 
of their ethical obligations . . . In short, play nice.”). 
 11. In either the direct or ironic sense. Compare, e.g., Wesley v. Gehrke, No. 194781, 1998 Mich. App. LEXIS 
1970, at *1 (Ct. App. Mich. July 24, 1998) (“A plaintiff may not evade the appropriate limitation period by artful 
drafting.”) with Dolemba v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., No. 15-C-463, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104314, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 
10, 2015) (“Although somewhat obscured by the complaint’s artful drafting  . . .”). For example, a test result may be 
statistically significant but of so little practical significance that the alleged injury remains hypothetical.  
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to screen and dismiss test results based on facially implausible or unscientific testing 
methods. Third, courts should recognize that the results of some tests may offer no 
plausible theory of harm to a consumer, even if plausible and properly pled. Finally, 
the preemptive effect of FDA testing regulations should guide courts resolving claims 
and plaintiffs planning testing litigation. 
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows: the next section provides 
background on recent food litigation and surveys the use of testing claims in litiga-
tion. The third section provides a statistical primer and reviews chemical testing 
methods used in complaints. The fourth details how pleading standards have been, 
and should be applied to product testing claims. The final section concludes by look-
ing to the future of product testing and regulation of the food industry. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The New Food Litigation 
Food and litigation have been entwined as long as food and litigation have ex-
isted.12 The surge of interest in unrefined or otherwise “real” food products has not 
been an exception. Producers met this demand through labeling that appeals to a 
purveyor of “natural” or similar foodstuffs, which in turn fed a steady stream of la-
beling-based food litigation, in essence a replacement for rare FDA enforcement ac-
tions.13 As labeling-based litigation expanded, attorneys realized the power of test 
results: they are quantitative, convey the power of the scientific method, and make a 
complaint hard to get rid of. At the same time, the ability and availability of testing 
methods increased, with laboratories only an internet search and FedEx drop box 
away. 
Together, these created a perfect litigation storm for food producers nation-
wide. In lawsuits spanning the consumer marketplace, plaintiffs began to claim liabil-
ity based on independent product testing.14 These plaintiffs typically send products 
to a laboratory, order tests to be performed on the product, and make the test results 
the basis for their complaint. The test result is tied to the labeling through a variety 
of methods, such as finding that nutrient content differs from label statements, show-
ing the presence of a substance not listed on the label, invalidating label statements 
suggesting pureness, or discovering the quantity of the product differs from that 
stated on the label. 
Although the testing in these lawsuits differs—from DNA testing to chroma-
tography—the suits share several common features. First, the complaints generally 
give only cursory detail on the alleged testing. For example, one detail repeated as a 
                                                          
 12. That is, for a long time. See, e.g,. Scott v. Shepherd, (1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 525; 2 Wm. Bl. 892 (helping establish 
the law of torts through an attempt to protect gingerbread from a flaming squib); Pearcy v. Walter, (1834) 172 Eng. 
Rep. 1220; 6 Car. & P. 232 (using drunk driving to help establish the law of negligence); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 
N.Y. 397 (1852) (helping establish warranty law through mislabeled supplement that contained poison). 
 13. See, e.g., JENNIFER L. POMERANZ, FOOD LAW FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, at ch. 8 “Litigation” (2016). 
 14. See Ann Havelka & Jeff Lingwall, Get Ready for the 2nd Wave of Food Labeling Litigation, LAW360, (FEB. 20, 2015), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/622279/get-ready-for-the-2nd-wave-of-food-labeling-litigation (describing prod-
uct testing in litigation). 
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mantra is the tests are “independent,” presumably meaning the plaintiffs or their at-
torneys did not personally operate the laboratory equipment that tested the product. 
But the complaints generally neglect to specify the laboratory, methodology, detailed 
results, margin of error, or statistical significance of any testing.15 The results of the 
testing are then connected to multiple causes of action through a loose theory of 
economic loss, along the lines of “the plaintiff overpaid,” or, “the product is worth-
less because it violates labeling law.” If a contaminant is found in the product, the 
space between the test result and the economic loss claim is filled with descriptive 
text alleging the ill-effects of the substance.16 
The idea of economic loss from mislabeling is then tied to potential causes of 
action. Litigation based on product testing can be brought under a number of con-
tract, tort, and consumer protection based theories of varying strength. Under a 
breach of contract theory, the plaintiff alleges the product label formed a contract 
between purchaser and producer, and the unacceptable deviation from labeling state-
ments breached that contract. Similarly, under a warranty theory, the plaintiff alleges 
that labeling claims constituted an express warranty, which test results show was vi-
olated. Alternatively, the plaintiff claims the test result shows the product is unmer-
chantable, violating the UCC’s implied warranty of merchantability. 
These contract-based theories have a number of weaknesses. Privity require-
ments under state law are unlikely to be met by a plaintiff’s purchase of the product 
from a retail store, and courts may question whether a product label constitutes a 
contractual offer in the first place.17 An alternative is a tort-based fraud claim, such 
as common law fraud or negligent misrepresentation. In these, the plaintiff claims 
the test results show the label misrepresents material facts as to the contents of the 
product, which the company has either negligently mislabeled or mislabeled with in-
tent to deceive. As with many fraud claims, proving intent and reliance is difficult.18 
                                                          
 15. There are exceptions, such as in Kumar v. Salov N. Am. Corp., No. 14-cv-02411-YGR (N.D. Cal. May 23, 
2014), in which the plaintiff provides some details about testing such as the type of laboratory used and how the test 
was performed. The complaint notes, “Plaintiff’s counsel had several bottles of Defendants’ Mock EVOO Products 
tested by an independent, IOC-accredited laboratory and organoleptic evaluation panel. Each bottle was purchased 
at well-known California retail stores, packed, and immediately shipped to an IOC-accredited laboratory and sensory 
panel for analysis. The olive oil was tested prior to the ‘best by’ date indicated by Defendants on the bottles.” Com-
plaint at ¶ 31. 
 16. These generally do not allege the plaintiff or potential class members suffered these effects. See, e.g, Complaint 
at ¶¶ 58-62, Organic Consumers Ass’n v. Post Foods, LLC, No. 1:16-cv-1640, (D.C. June 22, 2016) (noting link 
between glyphosate and cancer, disrupted immune function, and liver and kidney damage, without allegation these 
were suffered by any plaintiff); Complaint at ¶ 10, Slomski v. The Hain Celestial Group, No. 8:13-cv-01757 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 6, 2013) (noting that buprofezin causes lesions rodents and the potential neurotoxicity of chlorpyrofos-
ethyl without alleging plaintiffs were at risk from these conditions). See generally Hatchendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 
823 F.3d 724, 732 (1st Cir. 2016) (discussing standing concerning contamination of a medical product and noting 
“[a] list of horribles then appears, including heart and kidney failure, pain, vision and hearing impairments, and prem-
ature death. Utterly absent, however, is any allegation linking the alleged acceleration and contaminant injuries to any 
specific plaintiff.”). 
 17. For example, in litigation over nutrient content, nutritional facts statements present expected or average val-
ues of nutrients, rather than specific claims for the individual product at issue. See infra Section IV(E) (discussing 
preemption). 
 18. E.g., In re Bratten Apparel Corp., 21 B.R. 239, 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Fraud, by its very nature, is 
difficult to prove, as it is not readily susceptible of ocular observation. It is, by its nature, covert and surreptitious. 
Indeed, intent to defraud is rarely the object of direct proof, and must be inferred from the evidence in the case 
5
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Because of the inherent difficulties in contract and tort-based liability theories 
for consumer products, the real bite in product testing claims usually comes from 
state consumer protection laws. Every state has a consumer protection law which 
prohibits unfair or deceptive advertising, and these often lack the privity, reliance, 
and intent elements required in common law consumer claims.19  Florida’s Deceptive 
and Unfair Trade Practices Act is typical. It prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competi-
tion, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce.”20 Because these laws are written broadly, are 
easy to plead, and specifically concern advertising and consumer rights, they usually 
provide the vehicle for litigating test results. 
B. Categorizing Testing Claims 
While testing lawsuits generally follow this structure, testing itself is the Wild 
West. Some complaints test the defendant’s  product. Others do not, instead relying 
on testing reported in the news. Some report the results of the test, while others do 
not. Some specify that reputable laboratories and testing procedures were used, while 
others do not. These differences may stem from the recentness of product testing as 
a litigation strategy, while other differences stem from the advantages of first-filing 
in the class action setting, and others may reflect deliberate litigation strategy.21 
To bring some order to this area, this subsection categorizes testing complaints 
into four categories based on the kind of test and the nature of the allegations. 
1. Tests for the quantity of the product 
First, testing lawsuits are often based on quantity tests. These take several vari-
eties, such as tests for total quantity of the product, usable quantity, or quantity of a 
certain ingredient or component nutrient. If any of these quantities test different from 
what is specified on the label, or if an ingredient is listed on the label but does not 
test present in the product, the plaintiff alleges they and class members suffered an 
economic loss. In Hendricks v. StarKist Co., the plaintiff purchased 5-ounce cans of 
StarKist tuna. “Independent testing by a laboratory retained by Plaintiff’s counsel 
                                                          
dealing with the transaction in question.”); Michael Ferry, Proving Fraud Often Can Be Quite Difficult, Costly, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH  (June 17, 1995) (noting intent “is generally considered . . . to be the hardest part of proving fraud”); 
Kimberly Bales & Terry L. Fox, Evaluating a Trend Analysis of Fraud Factors, 5 J. FIN. & ACCT. 1, 2 (2011) (noting trends 
in fraud claims and that “[t]he difficulty with proving intent is that it requires determining a person’s state of mind”). 
 19. For a survey of state consumer protection laws, see Dee Pridgen, Wrecking Ball Disguised as Law Reform: Alec’s 
Model Act on Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 279, 281-91 (2015) 
(discussing history of state consumer protection laws); Spencer Weber Waller, In Search of Economic Justice: Considering 
Competition and Consumer Protection Law, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 636-39 (2005) (discussing private rights of action 
under state consumer protection law and the link between these laws and antitrust law) (citing Neil W. Averitt & 
Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 
(1997)). 
 20. FLA. STAT. § 501.204(a) (2015). 
 21. Like homesteading, the first claim to file within a state may take priority over later-filed claims. Thus, when 
news of testing results comes, complaints may simply reference the news result rather than testing the plaintiff’s 
product in order to file quickly.  
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determined that [the cans] contain an average of only 2.35 ounces” of tuna.22 Based 
on these allegations, the plaintiff alleged breach of express and implied warranties, 
unjust enrichment, violation of California consumer protection law, negligent mis-
representation, and fraud.23 
Next, in Tye v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the plaintiff purchased a can of Pork and 
Beans, subjected it to unspecified “rigorous scientific testing, including microscopic 
and chemical analysis,”24 and allegedly failed to find the presence of any pork in the 
product.25 Based on this, the plaintiff brought generic “breach of warranty” and un-
just enrichment claims on behalf of a nationwide class, and various state-specific 
claims on behalf of California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania subclasses.26 
Similarly, in Dougherty v. Source Naturals, Inc., the plaintiff purchased a bottle of 
multivitamins, had a lab test the vitamins for levels of various vitamins in the plain-
tiff’s product, and alleged a labeling violation based on the results of that test and 
other results from an internet product evaluation site, “labdoor.com.”27 Some nutri-
ents tested below the labeled amount, while others tested higher. Based on this, the 
plaintiff alleged violation of Missouri consumer protection law and unjust enrich-
ment.28 
Finally, a testing lawsuit might complain about the quantity of usable product, 
rather than the amount of a product, ingredient, or nutrient itself. In a flurry of law-
suits against Genentech for its cancer drug Herceptin, plaintiffs alleged that the usable 
quantity of the drug once reconstituted was less than the labeled amount.29 Based on 
this, the plaintiff alleged breach of warranties, violation of consumer protection law, 
and unjust enrichment.30 
                                                          
 22. Complaint at ¶ 2, Hendricks v. Starkist Tuna Co., No. 4:13-cv-00729 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2013) (plaintiff’s 
counsel tested the tuna “according to the methods specified by 21 C.F.R. § 161.190(c)” which details testing methods 
for tuna quantity); see also Complaint at ¶¶ 1-8, Magier v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 1:16-cv-00043 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2016) 
(raising similar allegations about Trader Joe’s canned tuna). 
 23. Complaint at ¶ 4, Hendricks v. Starkist Tuna Co., No. 4:13-cv-00729. By “California consumer protection 
law,” I mean alleged violations of California’s unfair competition law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 et seq., de-
ceptive advertising law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 et seq., and the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 et. seq.  
 24. Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 55, Tye v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. 8:15-cv-01615 (DOC-JCG) (C.D. Cal. 
May 20, 2016). 
 25. Order Granting in Part Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Class Action Complaint, Tye v. Wal-
Mart Stores Inc., No. 8:15-cv-01615 (DOC-JCG) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2016). 
 26. Complaint at ¶15-42, Tye v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. 8:15-cv-01615 (DOC-JCG) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2015). 
 27. Complaint at ¶ 17, Dougherty v. Source Naturals, Inc., No. 4:15-cv-00574 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 11, 2015); De-
fendant Source Naturals, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at 8, Dougherty v. Source Naturals, Inc., No. 4:15-cv-00574-RLW 
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 10, 2015). 
 28. Petition and Jury Demand at ¶ 29-38, Dougherty v. Source Naturals, Inc., No. 4:15-cv-00574. See also Com-
plaint at ¶¶ 25-26, Klingberg v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00138 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2017) (alleging test 
of Whole Foods’ St. John’s Wort product revealed levels of hypericin “a little above 30% of the label claim”).  
 29. E.g., Complaint at 7, Comanche Cty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-02498-JSC (N.D. Cal. 
May 9, 2016). 
 30. Id. at 10-14. 
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2. Tests for the quality of the product 
Next, some complaints examine the nature of the product itself. In Kumar v. 
Salov North America Corp., the plaintiff purchased a bottle of Filippo Berio extra-virgin 
olive oil.31 Olive oil has precise, regulated standards for various quality claims, rang-
ing from “extra virgin olive oil” to “virgin olive oil” to simply “olive oil,” based on 
the production method and the chemical composition of the oil.32 A number of tests 
are employed in making this distinction, including chemical analysis and tests for fla-
vor.33 The plaintiff had her bottle tested, found it did not meet the stringent standards 
required to be labeled “extra virgin,” and alleged violation of California consumer 
protection law, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and fraud.34 
Similarly, in Fonseca v. Goya Foods Inc.35 and Fonseca v. Vigo Importing Co.,36 the 
plaintiff purchased a variety of octopus products (such as Goya’s “Octopus in Olive 
Oil” and Vigo’s “Spanish Octopus in Soy and Olive Oil”), hired a lab to perform 
DNA testing on the meat, and claimed the products “are actually jumbo squid and 
not octopus.”37 Based on this, the plaintiff claimed breach of warranties, unjust en-
richment, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violation of various California stat-
utes. When Goya moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of detail on testing, the 
plaintiff responded by noting “those are topics Goya can probe in discovery.”38 
While still in litigation, Goya quietly changed its product label from “Octopus in Ol-
ive Oil” to “Jumbo Squid in Olive Oil – Octopus Style.”39 
Gubala v. HBS International Corp. represents a whole class of “protein spiking” 
lawsuits against supplement producers.40 In these lawsuits, the plaintiffs allege that 
producers calculate protein content using a test for the total amount of nitrogen in 
the product, a test that improperly counts “nitrogen-containing free-form amino ac-
ids” as protein.41 In Gubala, the plaintiffs performed an allegedly superior test for 
protein content, the “Protein Digestibility Corrected Amino Acid Score” test, and 
                                                          
 31. Complaint at 13, Kumar v. Salov N. Am. Corp., No. 14-cv-02411-YGR (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2014).  
 32. See, e.g., Havelka & Lingwall, supra note 14.  
 33. See, e.g., E. N. FRANKEL ET AL., REPORT: EVALUATION OF EXTRA-VIRGIN OLIVE OIL SOLD IN CALIFORNIA 
3-6 (U.C. Davis Olive Center, April 2011). 
 34. Complaint at 16-25, Kumar v. Salov N. Am. Corp.,  No. 14-cv-02411-YGR. 
 35. Complaint at 2, Fonseca v. Goya Foods Inc., No. 5:16-cv-02559-LHK (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2016). 
 36. Fonseca v. Vigo Importing Co., No. 5:16-cv-02055-EJD (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2016). 
 37. Complaint at 2, Fonseca v. Goya Foods Inc., No. 5:16-cv-02559-LHK. 
 38. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Goya Foods, Inc.’s Motion 
to Dismiss Complaint at 5, No. 5:16-cv-02559-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2016). 
 39. Compare, e.g., Goya Octopus in Olive Oil, AMAZON.COM, https://www.amazon.com/Goya-Pulpo-Octopus-
Ooil-Oz/dp/B005F5K6L8/ref=sr_1_1_s_it?s=grocery&ie=UTF8&qid=1471968468&sr=1-
1&keywords=goya+octopus [https://perma.cc/7BUY-6ECU] (visited Aug. 23, 2016), with Jumbo Squid in Olive Oil–
Octopus Style, JEWEL-OSCO, http://www.jewelosco.com/pd/Goya/Jumbo-Squid-in-Olive-Oil-Octopus-Style/4-
oz/041331036375/ [https://perma.cc/2ZN6-779D] (visited Aug. 23, 2016) (showing identical label image and 
SKU). 
 40. Gubala v. HBS Int’l Corp., No. 14-C-9299, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58988 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2016). For other 
examples, see infra Section IV (discussing preemption of protein spiking cases). 
 41. Id. at *4.  
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found results that showed a lower amount of “true” protein in the product. Based on 
this, they claimed breach of warranties and unjust enrichment on behalf of HBS.42 
3. Tests for the presence of substances not labeled 
Next in this taxonomy are tests for the presence of substances not on the label. 
In these suits, rather than testing for whether the label statements as to quality and 
nutrition content are true, the plaintiff tests for the presence of some substance not 
listed as an ingredient. In Nestlé Purina Petcare Co. v. Blue Buffalo Co,. and the class 
actions it spawned discussed in the introduction, Purina sued rival producer Blue 
Buffalo based on “[t]esting from an independent laboratory” that allegedly showed 
the presence of animal byproducts in the pet food.43 Blue Buffalo’s labels did not list 
animal byproducts as an ingredient, and so Purina alleged violations of the Lanham 
Act, common law unfair competition, and unjust enrichment.44 
Hunting for substances not on the label is not limited to pet food. In Cooper v. 
Quaker Oats Co.45 and a series of similar lawsuits,46 the plaintiff tested “natural” oat 
products for the presence of a herbicide used in production of oats. The plaintiff 
alleged “quantitative testing revealed that Quaker Oats contain glyphosate,”—other-
wise known as Roundup—and that “[d]iscovery of the true nature of the ingredients 
requires knowledge of chemistry and access to laboratory testing that is not available 
to the average reasonable consumer.”47 Without other detail about the test, the plain-
tiff alleged violation of California consumer protection law, false advertising, unfair 
competition, and breach of an express warranty.48 Later reporting disclosed the test-
ing was performed using liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry, which is dis-
cussed in the following section.49 
Moving from oats to wine, the plaintiff in Charles v. Wine Group, Inc. alleged 
“three separate testing laboratories skilled in arsenic testing” found “dangerously high 
levels of inorganic arsenic” among the wines of a variety of California producers.50 
Without furnishing substantive details on the testing methodology, the plaintiff al-
leged breach of California consumer protection law, unjust enrichment, negligent 
misrepresentation, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.51 
                                                          
 42. Id. at *17-20. 
 43. Complaint at 1, Nestlé Purina Petcare Co. v. Blue Buffalo Co., No. 4:14-cv-00859-RWS (E.D. Mo. May 6, 
2014).  
 44. Id. at 25-28. This case was brought as producer-on-producer, but spawned multiple consumer class actions 
that relied on the testing from the Purina lawsuit.  
 45. Cooper v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 3:16-cv-02364-LB (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2016). 
 46. Gibson v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 16-cv-04853 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2016); Cooper, No. 3:16-cv-02364-LB; Daly v. 
Quaker Oats Co., No. 16-cv-02155 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2016); Jaffee v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 16-cv-21576 (S.D. Fla. 
May 3, 2016). 
 47. Complaint at 13, 16, No. 3:16-cv-02364-LB. 
 48. Id. at 26-33. 
 49. Stephanie Strom, Quaker Oats’ 100% Natural Claim Questioned in Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2016. According 
to the Times, the test results found 1.18 parts per million glyphosate (the regulatory tolerance level is 30 parts per 
million).  
 50. Complaint at 3, Charles v. Wine Group Inc., No. BC576061 (Super. Ct. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015). 
 51. Id. at 24-27. 
9
Lingwall: Food Forensics in Class Action Litigation: The Race Between Plead
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
 222 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:213 
4. Testing complaints that fail to test the plaintiff’s product 
As a subset of tests for foreign material, many lawsuits are now based on testing 
that did not concern the plaintiff’s actual product. These are usually filed after public 
reports of some contamination to a product, such as the consumer class actions 
spawned in the Blue Buffalo litigation. In these, as in Hackman v. Kraft Heinz Food 
Co.,52 the plaintiff alleged that Kraft’s “100% Parmesan Cheese” actually includes up 
to 4% cellulose, contrary to the label.53 The plaintiff discovered this, not through her 
own testing, but through a Bloomberg news article discussing the use of cellulose in 
Parmesan.54 She then purchased the product and “has directed the Parmesan Cheese 
to be tested by an independent laboratory.”55 She “expects . . . that the results will 
show that the product contains filler, including an amount of cellulose that is decep-
tive to the consumer.”56 Based on this, the plaintiff alleged violation of District of 
Columbia consumer protection law, breach of express warranty, and breach of the 
implied warranty of merchantability.57 
Similarly, in Slomski v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., the plaintiff purchased bags of 
“natural” tea produced by Hain, referenced a report indicating that some bags had 
been found to contain pesticide residue, and sued.58 In a kind of dueling lack-of-
results, the complaint provided no substantive details on testing, while also calling 
out Hain for publicizing its own opposite-concluding test results without details.59 
Based on the apparent findings of this report, the plaintiff alleged violation of Cali-
fornia consumer protection law, and breach of express warranty.60 
Next, in Lucido v. Nestlé Purina Petcare Co., the plaintiff purchased bags of pet 
food, and referenced product testing by an advocacy group that found the presence 
of mycotoxins (a metabolite produced by fungus).61 Based on this test, the plaintiff 
alleged breach of express and implied warranties, negligence, negligent misrepresen-
tation, strict liability, and violation of California consumer protection law.62 
                                                          
 52. Complaint at 3-4, Hackman v. Kraft Heinz Food Co., No. 2:16-cv-00328-MRH (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2016). 
 53. Id.  FDA allows the use of cellulose as an anti-caking agent in grated cheese. See 21 C.F.R. § 133.146. 
 54. Lydia Mulvany, The Parmesan Cheese You Sprinkle on Your Penne Could Be Wood, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 16, 2016, 
4:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-16/the-parmesan-cheese-you-sprinkle-on-your-
penne-could-be-wood [https://perma.cc/R63C-VZJA]. 
 55. Complaint at 5,  No. 2:16-cv-00328-MRH. 
 56. Id. (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. at 8-11. 
 58. Complaint at 3-9, Slomski v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., No. 8:13-cv-01757-AG-AN (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2013). 
The report plaintiff referenced was from a study Glaucus Research Group initiated to criticize Hain and recommend 
selling its stock. See Samantha Bonar, High Levels of Pesticides Found in Celestial Seasonings Tea, LA WEEKLY (June 17, 
2013), http://www.laweekly.com/restaurants/high-levels-of-pesticides-found-in-celestial-seasonings-tea-2895931 
[https://perma.cc/J96K-9JBX]. 
 59. Complaint at 9, Slomski, No. 8:13-cv-01757-AG-AN (“Defendant has not disclosed the actual test results on 
which it relied . . . and, on information and belief, has claimed that the results constitute proprietary information.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 60. Id. at 15-19.  
 61. Complaint at 6, Lucido v. Nestlé Purina Petcare Co., No. 3:15-cv-00569-LB (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015) (“The 
Association for Truth in Pet Food conducted testing of Beneful Original and found that it contained dangerous levels 
of mycotoxins.”) 
 62. Id. at 9-16. 
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Finally, in In re Whole Foods Market, Inc., plaintiffs claimed Whole Foods 365 
Everyday Value Plain Greek Yogurt contained more sugar than labeled “[a]ccording 
to six tests conducted by Consumer Reports magazine.”63 Despite coordinating 
eleven class actions against Whole Foods, the plaintiffs failed to test any of the plain-
tiff’s purchases,64 and brought claims of “violations of various state consumer pro-
tection and unfair competition statutes as well as claims for breach of warranty, unjust 
enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, and for other equitable remedies.”65 
III. INTERPRETING PRODUCT TESTING RESULTS 
Understanding both the results reported in common consumer product testing 
class actions, and the policy implications inherent in accepting those test results, re-
quires a basic understanding of statistics and principles of chemical testing. This Sec-
tion provides a brief background on basic statistical concepts and examines several 
major chemical testing techniques. 
A. Statistical Primer 
Understanding typical product testing and the regulations surrounding it does 
not take an advanced degree in statistics, although some background in statistics is 
useful. Even if statistical concepts like formal hypothesis testing are not used in a 
product test, the language of statistics drives the conceptual interpretation of test 
results. This subsection introduces the basic statistical concepts needed to discuss test 
results and the regulatory environment of testing. 
First is the idea of summary statistics.66 A primary role of statistics is to sum-
marize data in an informative fashion, which serves as a springboard for understand-
ing the concepts behind those numbers. This is often done through a set of descrip-
tive statistics that summarize key parts of the data, such as its central tendency and 
variability.67 Each of these concepts has many different ways of being calculated. For 
instance, we might measure the center of a set of data by simply ordering the obser-
vations and picking the middle number—that is, we might calculate the median. Al-
ternatively, we might add up all the numbers and divide by how many numbers there 
are—that is, we might calculate the arithmetic average or mean. 
The variability of the data can also be measured in multiple ways. The most 
common are standard deviation and variance.68 The standard deviation represents 
the average difference between each number in the dataset and the arithmetic mean. 
                                                          
 63. Order at 2, In Re Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., No. A-14-MC-2588-SS, MDL. NO. 2588, at ¶¶ 30-31 (W.D. Tex. 
Feb. 12, 2016). 
 64. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 65. Id. at ¶ 3. The claims were dismissed as preempted by federal law. See infra Section IV. 
 66. The technical definition of a statistic is “[a] function of observable random variables . . . which does not 
depend on any unknown parameters.” LEE J. BAIN & MAX ENGELHARDT, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND 
MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 264 (1992). 
 67. For a more technical version of this discussion, see id. at 69-73, 290-91 (discussing the technical definitions of 
the median and sample moments). 
 68. To be precise, what is commonly used is the sample standard deviation and sample variance. See id. at 160-
61. 
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As a rule of thumb, about 66% of data fall within one standard deviation of their 
mean, and 90% of data fall within two standard deviations of their mean. The “vari-
ance” of a dataset is the square of the standard deviation, though I generally use the 
term in its colloquial sense of “variability.” 
These ideas are illustrated simply with an example dataset. Consider the follow-
ing 14 numbers: 0.10, 0.11, 0.18, 0.19, 0.20, 0.21, 0.22, 0.22, 0.22, 0.23, 0.28, 0.30, 
0.31, and 0.33, which represent acceptance rates at T14 law schools.69 The average 
rate is 0.22, and the standard deviation is 0.07. A common way to illustrate data 
graphically is through a histogram—a chart that sorts the data into a number of bins 
and then notes the frequency at which observations occur in each bin. A histogram 
of the T14 data, annotated with summary statistics, looks like this: 
 
A smaller standard deviation (less variability) would mean the data are grouped 
closer to 0.22, and a larger standard deviation (more variability) would mean the data 
are grouped farther away from 0.22. 
These numbers summarize the data, but how informative they are depends on 
the underlying nature of the data. For example, law school acceptance rates are driven 
by two factors: the number of applicants and the number accepted. The acceptance 
rate by itself tells us little about the selectivity of the school vis-à-vis the national 
applicant pool, because of selection bias in the choice of which schools to send an 
application. Because many students choose not to apply to some law schools, partic-
ularly if the chance of acceptance appears low, the “true” selectivity rate versus the 
average law school applicant differs from the reported rate. In other words, because 
a school has a 20% acceptance rate does not mean the average law school applicant 
faces a 20% chance of acceptance if choosing to apply. 
In the same way, details reported in a product test reflect the underlying data. 
For example, in a typical test for the quantity of an ingredient or nutrient, there are 
                                                          
 69. T14 Law Schools, START-CLASS.COM, http://law-schools.startclass.com/saved_search/T14-Law-Schools 
[https://perma.cc/9C8F-X34K] (last visited June 20, 2016). 
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at least three sources of variance. First, there is variance inherent in the ingredient 
itself. For example, nutrient content of a vegetable varies according to a multitude of 
factors, such as growing conditions, genetic factors particular to the individual plant, 
time since harvest, and conditions of storage.70 Second, the variance inherent in man-
ufacturing processes. When ingredients are extracted, baked, boiled, chopped, con-
centrated, and otherwise combined into a finished product, this process adds further 
variability, because no production run will ever be precisely the same due to, e.g., 
fluctuations in temperature in an oven, differences in personnel, and innumerable 
other factors.71 Finally, results of a test reflect the natural variability in a test itself. No 
matter the method, testing is a process that inherently creates variability. Product is 
crushed, melted, or vaporized, run through machinery, and handled by laboratory 
technicians. Even identical samples may generate different results based on the in-
herent variability of the test. 
If we combine the idea of central tendency and variability, we arrive at a pow-
erful statistical principle that bears on why many testing claims are preempted by 
federal law.72 The variability associated with an average will be lower than the varia-
bility from any single observation. Likewise, the more observations one has, the lower 
the variability of the average will be. For example, if you flip a fair coin four times 
and record the proportion of flips that land on heads, there is a good chance it might 
be either 0.0 (no heads) or 1.0 (all heads).73 But if you flip that coin a thousand times, 
there is a near-zero probability the total proportion heads will be either zero or one.74 
Assuming the coin is fair, the average from a thousand flips will be quite close to 0.5, 
because the variability of the average decreases with the size of the sample. The same 
principle applies when testing food: the larger the sample size, the less variability will 
be exhibited by the results of the analysis. 
B. Chemical Testing 
1. Classical methods 
With those statistical principles in mind, this subsection describes chemical test-
ing methods used in food litigation. Chromatography is one of the most commonly 
used techniques to separate and isolate organic molecules in a compound, making it 
useful for examining the components in food.75 The technique was discovered by 
                                                          
 70. FDA recognizes that “selected nutrients in some foods may undergo changes due to various factors (e.g., 
time after harvest or catch, processing, manufacture, conditions of transport).” FDA, Guidance for Industry: Nutrition 
Labeling Manual - A Guide for Developing and Using Data Bases (1998), http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegula-
tion/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm063113.htm#design_2. 
 71. See, e.g., MERTON R. HUBBARD, STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL FOR THE FOOD INDUSTRY 2 (2003) (“It is 
generally known that perfection is not possible . . . we must accept the fact that variability does exist  . . .”). 
 72. See infra Section IV(E). 
 73. The probabilities of each is about six percent, and can be calculated from the binomial distribution. See BAIN, 
supra note 66, at 91.  
 74. The probability of seeing no heads out of a thousand coin flips is 9.33x10-302, which is zero for practical 
purposes. 
 75. See ANDREAS MANZ, PETRA S. DITTRICH, NICOLE PAMME, & DIMITRI IOSSIFIDIS, BIOANALYTICAL 
CHEMISTRY 36 (2015). 
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Russian scientist Mikhail Tswett at the turn of the twentieth century, and involves 
dissolving the substance to be tested in a fluid, which is then passed through various 
materials.76 Because the components of the substance will move through the materi-
als at varying speeds, they separate and require differing amounts of time to hit a 
receptor.77 The times at which they hit the detector are recorded, and the result—
called a chromatograph—allows identification of the component substances. An ex-
ample of chromatographic output used in litigation is a test for the presence of amino 
acids in the Gubala protein powder litigation, discussed above.78 
A variant of chromatographic analysis called liquid chromatography-mass spec-
trometry combines its separating powers with mass spectrometry. Since some sub-
stances have similar chromatographic profiles, chromatography is often combined 
with another detection method, such as mass spectrometry.79 Mass spectrometry ion-
izes molecules from the substance to be tested, puts them in a vacuum to create 
distance between ions, then separates the ions by the ratio of their mass to their 
charge with a mass analyzer. A detector records this value, which allows identification 
of component substances.80 This was used to detect the presence of glyphosate in 
the Quaker Oats litigation.81 
2. Molecular recognition tests 
Another set of common chemical testing techniques use the biomolecular 
recognition properties of molecules—that is, the ability of molecules to form keys 
and locks.82 One example used in litigation is enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
testing, or ELISA. Immunoassay testing relies on the properties of antibodies. Be-
cause antibody molecules bind themselves to specific antigens, they can be used to 
detect the presence of particular molecules in a sample.83 A common example is a 
pregnancy test—the hormone human chorionic gonadotropic appears early in preg-
nancy. This binds with an antibody on the pregnancy test strip, which changes 
color.84 
ELISA is one of the most popular immunoassay formats. In essence, it fixes 
the antibody or the antigen to an assay plate, and uses an enzyme to detect binding 
between the antibody and the antigen.85 A substrate is then added, which reacts with 
the enzyme and changes color based on the amount of the antigen.86 The color 
                                                          
 76. Id. at 31. 
 77. Id. 
 78. The plaintiff’s chromatographs were reported in Complaint Exhibit A, Gubala v. CVS Pharm., Inc., No. 1:14-
cv-09039, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2016). 
 79. ROBERT E. ARDREY, LIQUID CHROMATOGRAPHY – MASS SPECTROMETRY: AN INTRODUCTION 33 (2003). 
 80. MANZ, supra note 75, at 93-95. 
 81. Strom, supra note 49. 
 82. MANZ, supra note 75, at 143. 
 83. See LARRY H. STANKER & ROSS C. BEIER, Introduction to Immunoassays for Residue Analysis: Concepts, Formats, and 
Applications, in IMMUNOASSAYS FOR RESIDUE ANALYSIS: FOOD SAFETY 2, 3-5 (1996). 
 84. MANZ, supra note 75, at 154-55. 
 85. See STANKER, supra note 83, at 7-8. 
 86. Id. 
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change is then quantified, such as by using a spectrometer. Compared to chromatog-
raphy or mass spectrometry, ELISA may perform a similar role, such as detecting 
glyphosate in Quaker Oats products,87 but is relatively inexpensive and simple to 
perform.88The cost of this convenience is that results may be less accurate than clas-
sical methods such as chromatography.89 
Finally, DNA testing is a form of molecular recognition test that can be used 
to identify the presence of substances in a product. This type of chemical testing has 
received ample treatment in the literature on criminal forensics, family law, and im-
migration, and relies on many of the same principles as immunoassay tests.90 DNA 
testing is based on the remarkable power of the DNA molecule to self-replicate. Cop-
ies of the molecule are made through a chemical process, such as polymerase chain 
reaction, which “melts” the DNA by splitting it into two strands, which become tem-
plates for “primer” molecules to attach. These new strands of DNA can then be split 
and reformed until multiple copies exist.91 These copies can then be tested for match-
ing with target DNA fragments in a process similar to immunosorbent assay testing.92 
IV. EVALUATING PRODUCT TESTING CLAIMS 
This Section motivates and describes the legal challenges inherent in evaluating 
testing claims and offers a framework for evaluating those claims. In a product testing 
lawsuit, (1) details on testing should be alleged as part of the initial pleading, as part 
of Rule 9’s particularity requirement for claims involving fraud, (2) a Daubert-like 
standard should apply to filter unscientific “testing” at the Rule 12 stage, as part of 
the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility requirements, (3) claims that have no practical sig-
nificance should be dismissed under either Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of standing) or Rule 
12(b)(6) (no plausible injury), and (4) whether claims are preempted by federal law 
should be evaluated.93 
                                                          
 87. The Alliance for Natural Health USA, Glyphosate Levels in Breakfast Foods: What is safe? (Apr. 19, 2016), 
http://www.anh-usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ANHUSA-glyphosate-breakfast-study-FINAL.pdf. 
 88. Didier Levieux, Immunodiagnostic Technology and Its Applications, in ADVANCES IN FOOD DIAGNOSTICS 211 (Leo 
M. L. Nollet & Y. H. Hui eds., 2007). 
 89. See STANKER, supra note 83, at 2 (“Traditionally, residue analysis has relied upon classical analytical methods 
such as chromatography . . . Such methods require highly trained individuals to operate sophisticated instruments 
and interpret complex . . . results. These features make most traditional residue methods highly accurate, but they 
also make them time consuming, costly, and generally not adaptable to use in the field.”); EPA, Nutrient Pollution Policy 
and Data, https://www.epa.gov/nutrient-policy-data/detection (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (noting that for some ap-
plications ELISA is “sensitive, rapid, and suitable for large-scale screening but [is] predisposed to false positives”). 
 90. E.g., Kerry Abrams and Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 757, 761 (2015) 
(discussing conceptual modes of DNA’s legal treatment); Llilda P. Barata, Helene Starks, Maureen Kelley, Patricia 
Kuszler, & Wylie Burke, What DNA Can and Cannot Say: Perspectives of Immigrant Families About the Use of Genetic Testing 
in Immigration, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 597, 601 (2015) (advising, e.g., that “immigration lawyers be educated about 
the test, the testing process, and the potential positive and negative consequences of test results so they can better 
advise their clients”); Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2920-25 (2010) (de-
scribing treatment of DNA testing by courts). 
 91. See MANZ, supra note 75, at 181. 
 92. Id. at 166-67. 
 93. This Section is written referencing federal standards, because most large class actions are removable under 
the Class Action Fairness Act, and because class action standards under state law are often analyzed with similar 
principles. 
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A. Pleading Standards Versus Technology 
The law moves at a glacial pace compared to technological change, and this is 
particularly true of procedure.94 Major changes in pleading doctrines come rarely, and 
even incremental changes in common law analysis take time.95 In contrast, testing 
technology changes quickly.96 DNA testing evolved from a costly, cumbersome pro-
cedure to a routine analysis in the space of two decades, a heartbeat in terms of the 
law.97 Advances in testing technology for foodstuffs have been a “technical ‘tour de 
force’” in recent years, reflecting advances in both interest and technology.98 To site 
just several examples, in 2016 a company launched an immunoassay ELISA test ca-
pable of rapidly detecting up to 0.1 parts per billion ethoxyquin in meat.99 Lectin chip 
arrays can now distinguish between the proteins in cow’s milk and buffalo milk, to 
examine whether buffalo mozzarella has been cheapened.100 Stable isotope analysis 
can determine where food was grown, and even how the food was produced.101 
These advances are admirable, turning food scientists into crime scene investi-
gators and providing means to independently verify the content of countless prod-
ucts, but they come at a cost. At a sufficiently high level of resolution, all food is 
contaminated, whether from contact with particulates in the air, from packaging, or 
from the inherently variable nature of its production.  
As detailed below, pleading standards often fail to provide sufficient screening 
mechanisms for early resolution of such claims. To avoid the possibility of expensive 
discovery and negative publicity that accompanies consumer class actions, defendants 
may opt to settle claims of questionable merit.102 As increasingly powerful testing 
                                                          
 94. Although cellphones existed since the 1980s, the Supreme Court did not require warrants before searching 
until 2014. Riley v. California 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (requiring that officers “generally” obtain a warrant before 
searching a cellphone). Or, despite GPS technology existing for consumer use since at least mid-2000s, the Court 
waited until 2012 before famously applying eighteenth century tort law to decide whether GPS tracking constitutes 
a search. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 95. E.g., fifty years passed between Conley and Twombly. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Conley 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 96. E.g., Nat’l Res. & Dev. Corp. v. Varian Assocs., 822 F. Supp. 1121, 1122-23 (1993) (describing “[m]odern 
spectroscopy”); MICHAEL LYNCH et al., TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA 
FINGERPRINTING (2008); Kelly Virkler & Igor K. Lednev, Analysis of Body Fluids for Forensic Purposes: From Laboratory 
Testing to Non-Destructive Rapid Confirmatory Identification at a Crime Scene, 188 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 1 (2009) (describing 
advances in spectroscopic identification). 
 97. See, e.g., John D. Groopman et al., Molecular Biomarkers for Human Liver Cancer, in I. GLENN SIPES et al., 
COMPREHENSIVE TOXICOLOGY 249, 256 (2002) (describing a “100 fold increase in sensitivity” in DNA-related test-
ing).  
 98. Primrose et al., supra note 3, at 582-83. 
 99. BIOO SCIENTIFIC, Bioo Scientific Launches ELISA for Screening of Ethoxyquin in Fishmeal, Fish, Shrimp, Feed and 
Meat (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.biooscientific.com/Bioo-Scientific-Launches-ELISA-for-Screening-of-
Ethoxyquin-in-Fishmeal-Fish-Shrimp-Feed-and-Meat. 
 100. Primrose et al., supra note 3, at 587. 
 101. Id. at 588. 
 102. On the risk of abusive litigation and disproportionate discovery costs, see e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 
(quoting Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony J. 
Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000)) (“[D]is-
covery accounts for as much as 90 percent of litigation costs when discovery is actively employed.”). Recent changes 
to Rule 26 requiring “proportionality” in discovery may be helpful in this regard, but past experience has shown that 
proportionality in discovery is easy to discuss but difficult to implement. See, e.g., Hon. Elizabeth D. Laporte and 
Jonathan M. Redgrave, A Practical Guide to Achieving Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 2015 
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brings litigation over smaller amounts of contamination, consumers risk losing label-
ing information that would otherwise usefully guide purchasing decisions. 
B. Pleading Testing-Based Fraud Claims with Particularity 
This Section argues for a Daubert-like gatekeeping standard to apply at the Rule 
12 stage when initial pleadings are based on product testing.103 It also argues that the 
mechanisms for applying this standard already exist—through the particularity re-
quirement for pleading fraud under Rule 9(b), the pleading standards in Twombly and 
Iqbal, and traditional principles of standing. Altogether, these provisions provide 
screening mechanisms that minimize litigation costs by keeping pseudo-scientific 
testing out of court and by filtering claims in which testing results have no practical 
significance. 
There is an extensive literature on the policy justifications for the gatekeeping 
role of judges in traditional Daubert motions. Daubert keeps pseudoscience out of 
court,104 minimizes litigation costs by providing standards for the admission of sci-
entific evidence before trial,105 and tempers the type of scientific evidence brought 
to court.106 Whether Daubert adequately meets these ambitions is controversial, but, 
at the least, it provides an enabling mechanism for pre-trial scientific screening.107  
Similar justifications apply to the need for attentive analysis of testing claims at 
the beginning of a suit. Scrutiny of alleged test results for reliability and practical in-
jury early in a suit reduces the risk of abusive litigation based on pseudoscientific test 
                                                          
FED. CTS. L. REV. 19, 22 (2015) (discussing the addition of rules to help with disproportionate discovery in 1983 and 
noting “[n]otwithstanding this watershed moment in the evolution of the Federal Rules, many litigants have seemingly 
been unable to master these proportionality concepts”); Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine For The New E-
Discovery Rules, 21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 49, 81 (2007) (discussing the 2000 amendments to the Rules affecting discov-
ery and noting that “courts and practitioners have ignored the amendments altogether”). 
 103. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). If not at the 12(b)(6) stage, certainly such a 
standard should apply at class certification. See Meredith M. Price, The Proper Application of Daubert to Expert Testimony 
in Class Certification, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1349, 1351-54 (2013). 
 104. E.g., Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 592, 606 (1998) (discussing Daubert and noting “the Court 
cannot abdicate its role as ‘gatekeeper’ and subject the jury unfairly to confusing and misleading ‘pseudoscientific’ 
research”); Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 919 (Ky. 2004) (“The Daubert factors were designed to make distinc-
tions between science and pseudo-science, between, for example, astronomy and astrology.”). See generally, West Vir-
ginia  v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 260 (W. Va. 1989) (“Pseudo-science is more dangerous than no science at all.”). 
But see Randolph N. Jonakait, The Meaning of Daubert and What That Means for Forensic Science, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2103, 2103 (1993) (arguing that “[t]his can be done only if there are general standards and methods applicable to all 
fields of science that distinguish genuine science from pseudoscience”). 
 105. See Margaret A. Berger, What Has A Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59, S65 (2005) 
(“Daubert works effectively as another tool for terminating litigation without a trial or jury.”); Jeffrey S. Parker, Daub-
ert’s Debut: The Supreme Court, the Economics of Scientific Evidence, and the Adversarial System, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5 
(1995) (discussing Daubert and “minimizing the costs of litigation”). 
 106. See Parker, supra note 105 (discussing Daubert and “disciplining the content of scientific evidence”). The same 
justifications apply to the existence of the previous Frye standard, although the details of the test differ. See Edward 
K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 
471, 475 (2005) (discussing adoption of Daubert and Frye standards in state court and noting “the choice between a 
Frye and Daubert standard does not make any practical difference”).  
 107. E.g., Elizabeth DeCoux, The Admission of Unreliable Expert Witness Testimony Offered by the Prosecution: What’s 
Wrong with Daubert and How to Make it Right, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 131 (2007) (discussing failures of Daubert in criminal 
proceedings); Jonakait, supra note 104, at 2103. 
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results, lowers the chance of delving into costly discovery, and disciplines pleading to 
focus on plausibility from the outset.108 
The mechanisms for this analysis are not novel. The first is Rule 9, which re-
quires fraud to be pled with particularity. The heart of most testing lawsuits is an 
allegation of fraudulent conduct, claims of fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and 
fraud-related consumer protection violations follow. According to Rule 9, fraudulent 
conduct must be pled in detail, or “with particularity.”109 The rationale behind this 
rule is the risk of abusive litigation that often accompanies allegations of fraud—it is 
otherwise easy to plead but enormously damaging to defendants. 
Courts have often interpreted this as requiring a plaintiff plead the “newspaper 
story” elements of the alleged fraud: who, what, where, when, and how.110 While 
plaintiffs often allege details concerning the plaintiff’s purchase, such as the location 
of the seller, or how much the plaintiff paid, plaintiffs in testing suits generally do not 
provide details on the testing itself—the core factual matter that reveals the alleged 
fraud.111 The defendant is thus left to respond to a lawsuit without knowing who 
performed the testing, what testing methods were used, or how much product was 
tested. In other words, defendants lack the very information they need “so that they 
can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything 
wrong.”112 
For example, in Tye v. Walmart Stores, Inc., the plaintiff devoted no less than eight 
pages of the complaint to scans of his receipts for Pork & Beans, while devoting only 
three sentences to the testing that formed the meat of the complaint, such as noting 
it was “rigorous” and involved “microscopic and chemical analysis.”113  
                                                          
 108. The general informational asymmetries in litigation have been the subject of much study. See, e.g. Corinne L. 
Giacobbe, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age:  Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically 
Stored Data, 57 WASH & LEE L. REV. 257, 258-59 (2000) (discussing the $3 million incurred by a defendant in response 
to a single discovery request and noting that electronic discovery has “a significant impact on the results of numerous 
cases”); Curt Cutting, Turning Point for Rule 10b-5: Will Congressional Reforms Protect Small Corporations?, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 
555, 560-61 (1995) (noting asymmetric discovery burdens in 10b-5 litigation). 
 109. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  
 110. E.g., U.S. ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006) (“To satisfy the particularity 
requirement of Rule 9(b), the complaint . . . must identify the ‘who, what, where, when, and how’ of the alleged 
fraud.” (quoting United States ex rel. Costner v. United States, 317 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2003))); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy 
Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted) (requiring “the who, what, when, 
where, and how of the misconduct charged”); In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547-48 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(internal quotation marks and modifications omitted) (superseded on other grounds) (requiring a plaintiff identify 
“[t]he time, place, and content of [the] alleged misrepresentation[s],” and “circumstances indicating falseness” or 
“manner in which the representations [at issue] were false and misleading”). 
 111. For example, in litigation over the nutrient quantity of multivitamins in Dougherty, the defendant producer 
argued that the product testing be pleaded with particularity. The plaintiff’s response reiterated the complaint by 
answering “How? By misrepresenting . . . the amount of . . . vitamins and minerals in the Multivitamin.” Plaintiff’s 
Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 15, Dougherty v. Source Naturals, Inc., No. 4:15-cv-00574-RLW 
(E.D. Mo. May 21, 2015). But see Kumar v. Salov N. Am. Corp., No. 14-CV-2411-YGR, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12790, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015) (finding complaint sufficient to satisfy Rule 9 without actual test results, noting 
“[t]he level of detail Salov seeks is not necessary at the pleading stage”). 
 112. Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 113. Second Amended Complaint at 15, Tye. V. Walmart Stores, Inc., No. 8:15-CV-01615-DOC-JCG (C.D. Cal. 
May 20, 2016). In an effort to head off a preemption challenge, the plaintiff also alleged compliance with unspecified 
“FDA Protocols,” and that at least 12 “samples” were used in testing. Id. at 15. 
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This general lackadaisical attitude towards pleading testing results has costs: 
when a defendant is left in the dark concerning the key aspect of the plaintiff’s com-
plaint, there can be no meeting of the minds leading to settlement. Both sides of the 
litigation may value the strength of the claim at such different values that early (e.g. 
pre-discovery) resolution may be impossible.114 
C. Twombly and Iqbal in Testing Claims 
Next, the plausibility standards embodied in Twombly and Iqbal should inform 
early evaluation of testing claims. A court must dismiss a complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) when it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”115 This “requires a plaintiff to show at 
the pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a ‘sheer possibility.’”116 
These cases characterized a shift in the philosophy of pleading. As put by Henry 
Noyes, prior pleading standards required that the court “accept the vision of the 
world described in the plaintiff’s complaint,” while Twombly and Iqbal require that 
“courts . . . develop a common law of federal pleading standards that will be im-
proved and refined over time.”117 
While previously the plaintiff’s factual allegations were accepted as true,118 now 
“judicial experience and common sense” interpret the “factual matter” in the com-
plaint and reach a conclusion on whether the plaintiff’s claim is plausible.119 The level 
of factual matter alleged in product testing claims varies widely, from chromatog-
raphy output in Gubala to a single sentence in Fonseca.120 However, courts have not 
quibbled over the level of detail.121 For example, in Fonseca the court noted, “whether 
a product labeled as ‘Octopus’ contains squid instead of octopus is a question of fact, 
not a question of law, and asserting that DNA testing found that the Octopus Prod-
ucts contained squid is a plausible factual allegation.”122 
Despite the difficulty defendants face evaluating a testing claim with little fac-
tual material, there are potential reasons behind the reluctance of courts to engage 
the machinery of Twombly and Iqbal in these claims. The actual test results may be 
                                                          
 114. See STEVE SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 401-07 (2004) (modeling settlement 
as a function of party beliefs regarding the value of the case). 
 115. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). 
 116. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 
 117. Henry S. Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: Iqbal, Twombly, and the Application of Judicial 
Experience, 56 VILL. L. REV. 857, 858-59 (2012). 
 118. E.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993) 
(“We . . . must accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint.”); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 
225 (1955) (“The allegations . . . on a motion to dismiss, must of course be taken as true.”). 
 119. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. 
 120. Complaint at 2, Fonseca, No. 5:16-cv-02559-HRL (“Independent DNA testing determined that Goya’s Octo-
pus Products are actually jumbo squid and not octopus.”). 
 121. See, e.g., Tye v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 8:15-CV-01615-DOC-JCG, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2016) 
(noting that the mere allegation that testing occurred, along with a photo of product, was sufficient to withstand Wal-
Mart’s motion to dismiss). 
 122. Fonseca v. Goya Foods Inc., No. 5:16-cv-02559-LHK, slip op. at 10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2016). In accepting 
these allegations as plausible, the court did not define what allegations of testing would not be factually plausible.  
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informally shared between parties off the record, and thus inform settlement deci-
sions without the court’s input. Courts may simply be reluctant to engage in the fac-
tual inquiry necessary to engage a testing result for plausibility early in litigation, pre-
ferring instead to let the test results play out during discovery or trial.123 Alternatively, 
courts may be presuming that plaintiffs will not make testing allegations that fall out-
side the boundaries of Rule 11.124 
This is regrettable. Early pleading of test results aids the defendant, the plaintiff, 
and the court system. For defendants, early pleading of test results lowers litigation 
costs by allowing pre-discovery arguments, such as preemption, to be raised at more 
than the theoretical level. In other words, even if the factual matter in the complaint 
satisfies Rule 11 (e.g. testing actually occurred, and substantively supported the alle-
gations in the complaint), testing often has subtle legal and practical implications that 
cannot be explored without results in hand. It is difficult to respond to allegations of 
a test with no details, and easier to respond the greater the level of specificity in the 
complaint. 
Early pleading of test results may also aid the plaintiff. For example, in the 
Gubala litigation about the protein content of a dietary supplement, the plaintiff opted 
to attach the test results to the initial complaint. Although federal preemption was a 
possible issue (which would have held the testing inadequate), the court found the 
plaintiff’s attached testing “nudge[d] his claims . . . ‘across the line from conceivable 
to plausible.’”125 When plaintiffs and defendants are aided through an information-
expanding policy, courts are also helped through reduced docket loads and lesser 
need to shepherd litigants through discovery.126 
D. “No-Injury Claims” and Practical Significance 
If plausible and pled with particularity, initial analysis of testing claims should 
then be informed by the broad debate about statistical versus practical significance 
that touches every aspect of science.127 This is most easily illustrated with the lan-
guage of significance testing, but applies broadly to testing results whether or not they 
                                                          
 123. The judiciary reflects the background of lawyers in general, who often come from backgrounds outside the 
hard sciences. See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States Designate Specialist Patent Trial Judges? An Empirical 
Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the Work of Professor Moore, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
169, 172 (2009) (quoting William C. Rooklidge & Mansi H. Shah, Creation of the Right to Interlocutory Appeal of Patent 
Claim Construction Rulings and Mandatory Stay Pending Appeal, The Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform, July 10, 2007, at 
8, http://www.patentsmatter.com/issue/pdfs/Interlocutory_Review_Paper.pdf) (“Many commentators attribute[d] 
the relatively high claim construction reversal rate to the fact that federal district court judges lack ‘both technical 
training and frequent exposure to patent cases in general and patent claim construction issues in particular.’”); Michael 
Nieswiadomy, LSAT Scores of Economics Majors: The 2008-2009 Class Update at 5 (2009), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1430654 (noting majors of 2008-2009 LSAT takers, with political sci-
ence leading the pack by a wide margin). 
 124. Rule 11 requires that “factual contentions have evidentiary support or . . . will likely have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 125. Gubala v. CVS Pharm., Inc., No. 14-c-9039, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32759, at *27 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2016). 
Whether the court would have accepted the allegations of testing without such support is unclear. 
 126. E.g., Godoy, supra note 10. 
 127. Compare, e.g., William E. Becker & William H. Greene, Teaching Statistics and Econometrics to Undergraduates, 15 J. 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 169, 175 (2001) (noting “the considerable controversy in the economics profession as well as 
in the rest of the social sciences over the application of statistical significance versus the magnitude and practical 
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use the formal language of hypothesis testing. A test result is “statistically significant” 
when the sampling error is sufficiently low to show that the estimated value differs 
from the hypothesized value. In other words, a result is “significant” if the signal is 
sufficiently strong to differentiate it from the surrounding statistical noise. But since 
statistical significance is concerned only with sampling variability, it has little to do 
with the practical significance of the result.128 
An example might be useful. Suppose a researcher wishes to examine a partic-
ular method for losing weight.129 The researcher performs a large-scale study by ran-
domly assigning many volunteers into a treatment group that follows the new meth-
odology and a control group who does not. After observing these two groups over 
the course of several months, the research shows that members of the treatment 
group lost, on average, 1/100th of a pound more than members of the control group. 
The researcher also shows this result is statistically significant. What then?! A weight 
loss of that magnitude is unnoticeable compared to daily fluctuation in weight, has 
no practical bearing on health, and would hardly be cause for celebration. In other 
words, although statistically significant, the result has no practical significance. 
This principle is often recognized in the law. In litigation over the amount of 
butterfat in croissants in The Pillsbury Co. v. Upper Crust Production Co., the court con-
sidered whether test results showed a “material difference” from the 50% butterfat 
standard for butter blend croissants. The court accepted a material difference as one 
exceeding “7.5% on either end of the 50% butterfat requirement.”130 Since test re-
sults were well outside that range, the court concluded the results to be practically 
significant.131 Similarly, when examining potential discriminatory practices, the 
                                                          
importance of an effect”); Deirdre N. McCloskey & Stephen T. Ziliak, The Standard Error of Regressions, 34 J. ECON. 
LIT. 97, 97 (1996) (“[O]ur main point . . . is that a difference can be permanent . . . without being ‘significant’ in other 
senses, such as for science or policy. And a difference can be significant for science or policy and yet be insignificant 
statistically, ignored by the less thoughtful researchers.”); Deirdre (né Donald) N. McCloskey, Other Things Equal: The 
Bankruptcy of Statistical Significance, 18 E. ECON. J. 359, 359-60 (1992) (gathering literature on critiques of statistical 
significance tests done without further consideration, such as to the power of the test); Deirdre (né Donald) N. 
McCloskey, The Loss Function Has Been Mislaid: The Rhetoric of Significance Tests, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 201 (1985) 
(“[Significance] test[ing] can only affirm a likelihood of excessive skepticism in the face of errors arising from too 
small a sample. The test does not tell . . . whether a fitted coefficient is large or small in an economically significant 
sense.”) with, e.g., Kevin D. Hoover & Mark V. Siegler, Sound and Fury: McCloskey and Significance Testing in Economics, 
15 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 1, 4 (2008) (“We reiterate that we accept that statistical significance is not economic 
significance. No doubt there are cases of people mistaking one for the other. Yet, the evidence that this mistake is 
widespread and systematic is very weak.”); id. at 15 (“The principal claim – ‘the effect is empirically there, whatever 
the noise is’ – is extraordinary. Noise masks the signal. It may be there or it may not be there. The point is that we 
do not know.”). 
 128. In one sense, finding statistical significance is “easy.” There are established methods and well-studied princi-
ples that govern, and the outcome is usually pleasantly dichotomous (significant, or not). Practical significance is 
messy. There are no generally accepted guidelines for practical significance that span the sciences and no unifying 
language for the importance of practical effects across disciplines. 
 129. E.g., performing Tabata reps timed to reading paragraphs of this Article. 
 130. Pillsbury Co. v. Upper Crust Prod. Co., No. 98-cv-6114, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 307, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 
6, 2004). The testing on buttered croissants represents a “golden” standard. Besides appropriately considering a mar-
gin of error, “[n]umerous tests performed by reputable independent laboratories following established scientific pro-
tocols produced consistent findings . . .” Id. The opinion is also an example of excellent legal writing. E.g., id. at *1, 
36 (“The hard facts of this dispute center upon a soft roll known as the croissant . . .  Exactly how much butter must 
a croissant blended with butter have to contain to be properly labeled a ‘butter blend’ croissant?”). 
 131. Id. at 36. 
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EEOC uses the “four-fifths” rule, in which the selection rate for a protected group 
is compared to the rate of the largest group of employees. A selection rate for the 
protected group less than four-fifths that of the largest group provides initial evidence 
of a discriminatory effect.132 Even if the results of an analysis are statistically signifi-
cant, the finding is potentially non-actionable unless the four-fifths rule is satisfied, 
that is, unless it meets the guidelines for practical significance. 
In consumer class actions, one direct legal application of the practical signifi-
cance principle is through the doctrine of standing.133 Broadly speaking, the concept 
of standing enforces the constitutional requirement of an actual “case or contro-
versy” before federal court jurisdiction exists.134 It is evaluated according to the same 
plausibility standards as a motion to dismiss relying on Twombly and Iqbal.135 As re-
cently emphasized by the Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, this requires an 
injury be both concrete and particularized.136 An injury is particularized when it “af-
fect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way,”137 and an injury is concrete 
when it “actually exist[s].”138 As used in the context of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
an example of a non-concrete injury is “dissemination of an incorrect zip code” 
which, “without more, could not work any concrete harm.”139 
Some types of testing results are analogous to the incorrectly reported zip 
code—if chemical test results show the presence of microscopic amounts of a foreign 
substance, undetectable to the consumer, and without any practical consequence, it 
might not matter. The results might not be practically significant. For example, con-
sider the glyphosate litigation. In these cases, plaintiffs allegedly found 1.8 parts per 
                                                          
 132. See Michael Stenger, The First Circuit Strikes Out in Jones v. City of Boston: A Pitch for Practical Significance in Disparate 
Impact Cases, 60 VILL. L. REV. 411, 413-14 (2015) (noting that some courts require practical significance in discrimi-
nation claims, while others do not). Compare, e.g., Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376-77 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (noting “statistical significance does not show ‘importance’…  or ‘practical significance’”) with, e.g., Jones 
v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2014) (rejecting the argument that “even a showing of a statistically 
significant disparity is insufficient if the size of the impact is not sufficiently large, or ‘practically significant,’ as meas-
ured by the so-called four-fifths rule”); Stagi v. AMTRAK, 391 Fed. Appx. 133, 144-45 (3rd Cir. 2010) (“[T]his Court 
has never established ‘practical significance’ as an independent requirement for a plaintiff’s prima facie disparate 
impact case  . . . [W]e find that in a case in which the statistical significance of some set of results is clear, there is no 
need to probe for additional ‘practical significance.’”). Of course, the parallel to employment law is inexact, because 
a single wrongful employment action would have practical impact on that person. 
 133. The state analog of standing in consumer class actions is the injury requirement embodied in state consumer 
protection laws. These vary by state, but often require an “ascertainable loss” or similar language. E.g. ALASKA STAT. 
§ 45.50.531 (requiring “an ascertainable loss of money or property”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 41-110g (requiring an 
“ascertainable loss of money or property”); FLA. STAT. § 501.211(2) (requiring a “loss”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
51:1409 (“ascertainable loss”); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.025.1 (similar); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 (similar); ORE. REV. 
STAT. § 636.638(1) (similar); White v. Mock, 104 P.3d 356, 364 (Idaho 2004) (similar). Arguments similar to lack-of-
standing can be raised under these laws, by alleging the consumer has not suffered actual loss, let alone one that is 
ascertainable. 
 134. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (“Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which 
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of 
standing.”). 
 135. E.g., Hotchendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 731 (1st Cir. 2016) (collecting cases). 
 136. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, slip op. at 1543 (2016). 
 137. Id. at 1548. 
 138. Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 139. Id. at 1550. 
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million glyphosate in Quaker Oats products. This amount is far less than the level 
allowable by regulation, and has no reported effects on health or practical effect on 
the food as a preservative or otherwise.140 In Woods v. Nature’s Variety, the product in 
question was a pet food. The plaintiff alleged the presence of ethoxyquin in its pet 
food, an artificial preservative FDA allows in pet and human foods at certain lev-
els.141 The complaint did not allege testing the product, but posited the presence of 
ethoxyquin based on its possible use as a preservative of fish meal, which was an 
ingredient in the product. Alleging a trace preservative, that might have been used on 
an ingredient, was sufficient to reach a settlement, despite questionable practical sig-
nificance.142 
E. Preemption Possibilities 
1. Testing requirements for producers 
A final aspect that courts and litigants should consider is whether claims will be 
preempted by federal law, such as by FDA regulation. Consumers take FDA labeling 
requirements as a fact of life, and learning to interpret nutrient content claims on 
FDA-mandated food labels is a rite of passage for functioning in modern society.143 
Less known are the requirements FDA has promulgated for calculating what goes on 
the label, and how FDA monitors compliance with labeling requirements. Under the 
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (the FDCA) and its revisions in the Nutrition 
Labeling and Education Act of 1990, FDA has promulgated various sets of rules 
governing product testing. There are two main divisions: rules for how a company 
decides what goes on a label, and rules for how FDA evaluates the label. While there 
is much product and ingredient-specific guidance regulation, the basic principles are 
straightforward.144 
For food and supplement producers creating a label, FDA regulations do not 
provide detailed guidance on how to test nutrient claims. In its Food Labeling Guide, 
FDA notes it “has not stated how a company should determine the nutrient content 
of their product for labeling purposes . . . Regardless of its source, a company is 
                                                          
 140. Cf. Gedalia v. Whole Foods Mkt. Servs., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 943, 958 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (rejecting the argument 
that “since Whole Foods has developed a successful brand as a provider of natural foods, it should be obligated to 
guarantee every molecule in every product it sells under its in-house brand is natural”) (emphasis added). 
 141. E.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 172.140 (allowing up to 5 parts per million ethoxyquin in uncooked meat), 573.380 (allowing 
up to 150 parts per million ethoxyquin in animal feed). 
 142. By contrast, other test results show a clear potential for injury, such as when the quantity of goods sold differs 
from the labeled amount (under filled tuna), or where the quality of the good differs substantially from the labeled 
description (squid instead of octopus). 
 143. For example, many states include study of nutritional labeling as part of their public school curriculum. E.g., 
Calif. Dept. Ed., Nutrition to Grow On (July 30, 2015), http://www.cde.ca.gov/ls/nu/he/nrttogrow.asp; Wisc. Dept. 
Pub. Instr., Teaching Nutrition through Family and Consumer Sciences: A Curriculum Guide for Middle Schools (2013), 
https://dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/school-nutrition/pdf/tncurr.pdf; see also Dan J. Graham and Robert W. 
Jeffery, Location, Location, Location: Eye-Tracking Evidence that Consumers Preferentially View Prominently Positioned Nutrition 
Information, 111 J. AM. DIET ASSOC. 1704 (2011) (using eye-tracking software to analyze consumer use of nutrition 
labels and finding “[s]elf-reported viewing of Nutrition Facts label components was higher than objectively measured 
viewing”).   
 144. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(i) (outlining tests for protein content). 
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responsible for the accuracy and the compliance of the information presented on the 
label.”145 For convenience, companies may rely on previously established food data-
bases to compute nutrition values, and FDA provides an extensive guidance docu-
ment on the development of such databases.146 
2. Testing requirements for FDA enforcement actions 
More precise rules apply when FDA evaluates a label claim. FDA monitors 
compliance with label statements according to the schema in 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(g). 
There are nine subsections. Sections (1) and (2) specify what FDA gathers to test a 
claim—a combined sample of twelve subsampled consumer units from twelve dif-
ferent shipping cases.147 Section (2) further specifies that analysis must be conducted 
according to either FDA specifications or “the ‘Official Methods of Analysis of the 
AOAC International’” (the AOAC is a non-profit association that establishes chem-
ical analysis methods).148 
Subsections (3) to (9) detail what constitutes a violation, with differing require-
ments by nutrient.149 These subsections also give guidelines for what is not a violation 
by specifically providing for the variability inherent in natural ingredients, manufac-
turing, and testing.150 For example, subsection (4) notes that for “naturally occurring” 
nutrients, a test result at 80% or more of the labeled amount satisfies the regulation, 
and states that “no regulatory action will be based on a determination of a nutrient 
value that falls below this level by a factor less than the variability generally recognized 
for the analytical method used in that food at the level involved.”151 Subsection (5) 
furthers this concept, noting that deviations from labeled amounts are “acceptable 
within current good manufacturing practice.”152 
                                                          
 145. FDA, Guidance for Industry: A Food Labeling Guide (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutri-
tion/ucm064894.htm; see also FDA, Guidance for Industry: Nutrition Labeling Manual - A Guide for Developing and Using 
Data Bases (1998), http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInfor-
mation/LabelingNutrition/ucm063113.htm# (“The agency has not and does not intend to prescribe how an indi-
vidual company is to determine nutrient content for labeling purposes.”). 
 146. See id. For some nutrients FDA provides additional guidance, such as by noting “[p]rotein content may be 
calculated on the basis of the factor of 6.25 times the nitrogen content of the food. . . .” 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(7). See 
Durnford v. Musclepharm Corp., No. 15-cv-00413-HSG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170351 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2015) 
(discussing 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(7)). 
 147. “The sample for nutrient analysis shall consist of a composite of 12 subsamples (consumer units), taken 1 
from each of 12 different randomly chosen shipping cases, to be representative of a lot.” 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(g)(2).  For 
dietary supplements the rules are slightly different. According to 21 C.F.R. § 101.36(f)(1), “the sample for analysis 
shall consist of a composite of 12 subsamples (consumer packages) or 10 percent of the number of packages in the 
same inspection lot, whichever is smaller, randomly selected to be representative of the lot.” 
 148. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(g)(2). 
 149. Nutrients are divided into two categories based on whether they are added to fortified foods or naturally 
occurring. Nutrients in fortified foods must test with at least the labeled amount, and naturally occurring nutrients 
must test at 80% of the label amount. 
 150. See supra Section III(A). 
 151.  21 C.F.R. § 101.9(g)(4) 
 152. Specifically, nutrient content may exceed the labeled amount consistent with good manufacturing practice, 
and calories, fat, cholesterol, and sodium may be deficient consistent with good manufacturing practice. Id. 
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3. Preemption as applied 
Courts have approached preemption arguments in product testing claims in 
different ways. Some have embraced the doctrine at the motion to dismiss stage, 
while others have found allegations sufficient to continue into discovery. The policy 
justification for preemption based on the 12-sample methodology is simple. If not 
followed, courts implicitly require a higher standard for manufacturing quality control 
than that imposed by FDA. Ensuring that the mean level of a nutrient in a product 
meets FDA’s 12-sample methodology is very different from ensuring the level of the 
nutrient in each product. Remember, variance is a function of sample size. The larger 
the sample size, the smaller the variance around the mean of a sample. Thus, ensuring 
quality control based on a 12-sample test is far easier than ensuring standards for each 
individual product. 
The earliest case to find preemption based on the testing method did so at the 
summary judgment stage, in Vital v. One World Co.153 There, the plaintiffs claimed 
One World mislabeled the amount of magnesium and sodium in its coconut water 
based on an independent test by ConsumerLab.com. The court granted summary 
judgment to the defendant because the testing did not comply with the 12-sample 
methodology in § 101.9(g)(2), and nicely summarized the statistical issues at play:  
Under the § 101.9(g) methodology, it is impossible to determine whether a company 
is in compliance with the Food Labeling Rule by testing less than twelve products from 
twelve different shipping cases. If only eleven products are tested, a hypothetical 
twelfth product could raise the average nutrient content to a sufficient level.154 
In following cases, preemption was found earlier than at summary judgment. 
In Salazar v. Honest Tea, Inc., the plaintiffs claimed that “independent testing by a la-
boratory” showed the level of antioxidants in Honest Tea’s Honey Green Tea did 
not match the label.155 Again, because testing procedures did not follow the 12-sam-
ple methodology required by regulation, the court found the claim preempted by the 
FDCA on a motion to dismiss. Similar results have come in cases for a number of 
products, such as calorie count in ice cream,156 the level of nutrients in vitamins,157 
the amount of protein in supplements,158 and the amount of sugar in yogurt.159  
Not all courts agree. Some have found the plaintiff’s testing of a single purchase 
sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss, reasoning that the test shows likelihood 
                                                          
 153. Vital v. One World Co., No. SACV 12-00314-CJC (MLGx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186203, at *15-16 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 30, 2013). 
 154. Id. at *14. 
 155. Salazar v. Honest Tea, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1313-14 (E.D. Cal. 2014). See generally James P. Muehlberger 
& Jeff Lingwall, Plaintiffs Look Beyond Labels and Toward Product Testing, LAW360 (2015) (discussing preemption and the 
Honest Tea case). 
 156. Burke v. Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 2d 478, 480-83 (D.N.J. 2013). 
 157. Dougherty v. Source Naturals, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 3d 831 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2015). 
 158. Bruaner v. MusclePharm Corp., No. 14-cv-8869-FMO(AGRx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105515, at *4 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2015); Mee v. I A Nutrition, Inc., No. C-14-5006 MMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63038, at *11-12 (N.D. 
Cal. May 13, 2015). 
 159. In re Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., No. A-14-MC-2588-SS, MDL. NO. 2588, 163 F. Supp. 3d 385, 387 (W.D. Tex. 
Feb. 12, 2016). 
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that the 12-sample methodology would show similar results if performed.160 For ex-
ample, in Gubula v. CVS Pharmacy, the court found several factors significant. First, it 
relied on generous interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal from the Seventh Circuit to 
find that testing a single purchase made the complaint plausible. This puts much trust 
in a single data point. It also assumes the single data point will be predictive of the 
results from a larger, random sample, which may not be the case if, e.g., multiple 
purchases had been tested and an outlying result had been chosen to report.161 
Next, the court cited FDA discussion noting that producers may verify label 
contents as they pleased, so long as the labels also complied with the methodology in 
§ 101.9. The court then reasoned that “[i]f CVS can show regulatory compliance using 
other reliable methods, then it would make sense that [the plaintiff] should similarly 
be able to show non-compliance using other reliable methods.”162 This reads the 
regulation and guidance backward, putting the cart (enforcement under § 101.9) 
ahead of the horse (internal quality control methods). Producers do not show regu-
latory compliance using “other reliable methods.” Instead, they may use those meth-
ods internally so long as those methods lead to products compliant under § 101.9. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As testing methods continue to improve, publicity surrounding testing-based 
lawsuits spreads, and testing becomes increasingly affordable, litigation based on 
product testing will play an increasingly important role in consumer class actions. The 
particular litigation hooks may change over time, but the technique of embedding 
testing results as the foundation of class action complaints will remain. For instance, 
many of the cases discussed in this Article hinged on use of the word “natural” on 
the label, which the testing challenged based on the presence of unnatural substances. 
Because of the quantity of these lawsuits, many companies are moving away from use 
of “natural” on their labeling, and FDA is considering rules that would give regulatory 
meaning to the term.163 But whether “natural” is replaced on labels by “essential,” 
“simple,” “real,” “honest,” or “ancient,” analogous litigation hooks will remain and 
testing-based litigation will continue. 
As claims based on testing continue to proliferate, it becomes increasingly im-
portant for courts to apply sensible pleading standards and serve as gatekeepers to 
                                                          
 160. Gubala v. CVS Pharm., Inc., No. 14-c-9039, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32759, at *28 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2016) 
(“[T]his Court holds that Plaintiff may rely on the testing results attached to the amended complaint to nudge his 
claims based on an overstated declaration of protein content ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”) (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); Smith v. Allmax Nutrition, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00744-SAB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171897, 
2015 WL 9434768, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2015) (similar); Clay v. Cytosport, Inc., No. 15-cv-165 L(DHB) (Aug. 
19, 2015) (“Of course, in order to ultimately prevail on these claims, Plaintiffs will have to prove that Defendant did 
not comply with the FDCA provisions listed above. However, to state a claim, Plaintiffs only need to allege a plausible 
violation of the FDCA.”).  
 161. Due to natural variance in levels of nutrients in any product, sufficient seriatim testing would generally reveal 
something varying from the label. If enough clover leaves are picked at random, you will find one with four leaves, 
regardless of luck. 
 162. Gubala, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32759, at *29-30 (discussing Food Labeling; General Provisions; Nutrition 
Labeling; Petitions, Definition of Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cho-
lesterol Content of Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302-01, 2311, 1993 WL 1540 (F.R.) (Jan. 1993)).  
 163. E.g., Mortazavi, supra note 2, at 945-50, 962-65; 80 F. R. 69905 (Nov. 12, 2015) (announcing notice and 
comment period for potential FDA regulation of the word “natural”). 
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claims that fail to plausibly show injury. The tools and principles provided in this 
Article propose such a framework, showing how well-worn pleading requirements 
such as Rule 9(b), Twombly and Iqbal, traditional notions of standing, and awareness 
of preemption possibilities can shepherd testing lawsuits toward efficient resolution. 
As high but obtainable standards are applied to food and litigation, the promise of 
food forensics to effect meaningful change will be realized. 
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